University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Public Policy Initiative Issue Briefs

Wharton Public Policy Initiative

11-2015

The Potential Effect of Offering Lump Sums in the Social Security
Program
Raimond Maurer
Oliver S. Mitchell
University of Pennsylvania, mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu

Ralph Rogalla
Tatjana Schimetschek

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi
Part of the Public Policy Commons, Social Welfare Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Maurer, Raimond; Mitchell, Oliver S.; Rogalla, Ralph; and Schimetschek, Tatjana, "The Potential Effect of
Offering Lump Sums in the Social Security Program" (2015). Wharton Public Policy Initiative Issue Briefs.
12.
https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/12

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/12
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Potential Effect of Offering Lump Sums in the Social Security Program
Summary
New research reframes the debate about Social Security solvency and moves away from questions of
who should bear the greater burden of fixing the system by offering a lump sum payment model as a way
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alternatives presented in this brief, survey participants indicated a willingness to delay claiming Social
Security by up to eight months, on average, compared to the status quo, and to continue working for four
of them. Delayed claiming would mean additional months or years of Social Security payroll tax
contributions, which could modestly improve the program’s solvency.
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Raimond Maurer, PhD; Olivia S. Mitchell, PhD;
Ralph Rogalla, PhD; and Tatjana Schimetschek, MSc

Headlines about H.R.1314, the 2015 “Bipartisan Budget Act,” focused mainly
on the deal’s success in avoiding another collision with the debt ceiling, along
with the fact that the compromise included federal spending increases for the
first time in several years.
Another key component, however, was a change to the
Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance program
(OASDI)—the official name for Social Security in the
United States—and this merits a closer look.
When Social Security revenue is collected through
payroll taxes, the vast majority of these taxes flow to
either the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)
Trust Fund or the Federal Disability Insurance (SSDI)
Trust Fund. Collectively, these Trust Funds have enough
reserves to remain solvent until 2034.2 But as noted
recently in Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative’s
September 2015 Issue Brief, “Social Security’s Trustees
have indicated that [the SSDI Trust Fund] will be fully
depleted by late 2016 unless the U.S. Congress enacts
changes before then.”3 While no change in H.R. 1314
alters the combined OASI-SSDI reserve projection
of 2034, the Act does delay SSDI Trust Fund reserve
depletion until 2022.4 This is to be accomplished via
the reallocation of payroll taxes in calendar years 2016
through 2018, when a greater portion of the OASDI
payroll tax, financed equally by employees and employers, will be directed to the SSDI Trust Fund.5
The postponement of SSDI reserve depletion means
that cuts in monthly benefits to disabled workers and

SUMMARY
• Political debate has focused on the question of whether Social
Security solvency should be achieved by larger benefit cuts or
higher taxes, which in effect asks which people—current or
future generations—should bear the greater burden of fixing
the system.
• But new research reframes this debate, offering a budgetneutral, actuarially fair lump sum payment, instead of the current
delayed retirement credit, as a way to encourage people to
delay claiming their Social Security benefits and work longer.
• Under one of the lump sum alternatives presented here, survey
participants indicated a willingness to delay claiming Social
Security by up to eight months, on average, compared to the
status quo, and to continue working for four of them.
• Delayed claiming would mean additional months or years of
Social Security payroll tax contributions, which could modestly
improve the program’s solvency. Other benefits are possible as
well: improved physical and mental health among the elderly
from extended labor force participation, which could reduce the
strain on health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid and
help offset the macroeconomic costs of an aging population.
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their families will not materialize
in the weeks leading up to the 2016
Presidential election. Given that, it
seems unlikely that Congress will
do much more in the short run to
resolve longer-term Social Security
solvency. Nevertheless, a few Presidential candidates, specifically Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and New
Jersey Governor Chris Christie, have
made Social Security solvency concerns a central part of their respective
platforms and could influence new
legislation to address future Trust
Fund shortfalls. To date, however,
it appears that their proposed solutions may improve solvency only very
slightly, if at all.
Recent analysis from the Urban
Institute looked at several reform
options in terms of their impact on
Social Security solvency.6 For example, it showed that raising the OASI
full retirement age (FRA), currently
age 67, would extend Trust Fund
reserves by only one year. Similarly,
a modest increase in the early retirement age, currently age 62, would
have virtually no impact on solvency.
Boosting the payroll tax rate could
help, but this is politically unappealing
to many. And finally, eliminating the
current wage cap of $118,500 (as suggested by Sanders) would require the

roughly 7% of earners who earn more
than the cap to send 12.4% more
of their pay into OASDI each year.
Nevertheless, even this action only
adds 21 additional years of solvency to
the Trust Fund. In other words, even
the last, fairly costly, proposal is not an
enduring solution.
Almost inevitably, then, political
debate has turned to a discussion over
whether solvency should be achieved
by larger benefit cuts or higher taxes,
which in effect asks which people—
current or future generations—should
bear the greater burden of fixing the
system. Yet new research7 by Olivia S.
Mitchell of the University of Pennsylvania, her colleagues Raimond
Maurer and Tatjana Schimetschek
of Goethe University Frankfurt, and
Ralph Rogalla of St. John’s University
(the research team hereafter referred
to as MMRS), reframes the Social
Security debate in a different light. As
this Issue Brief describes, they offer a
budget-neutral, actuarially fair lump
sum payment—instead of the current
delayed retirement credit—as a way
to encourage people to delay claiming
their OASI benefits and work longer.
As life expectancies continue to
rise and OASDI Trust Funds hurtle
toward insolvency, attempts to prolong working years and incentivize

delayed benefits claiming become very
important in sustaining Social Security. Accordingly, the results of this
alternative approach will be useful for
policymakers, namely in (1) measuring
who would delay claiming benefits if
offered a lump sum instead of higher
annuity payments, (2) examining how
long they would wait, and (3) how
much longer, if at all, they would continue working in the interim.

THE MOST IMPORTANT
FINANCIAL DECISION MANY
HOUSEHOLDS WILL EVER
MAKE
Currently, the U.S. Social Security
status quo rules allow eligible workers
to claim retirement benefits as early
as age 62 and as late as age 70. It is
not until age 67, the aforementioned
FRA, that first-time benefits claimants would receive monthly benefits
equal to 100 percent of their primary
insurance amounts, or PIAs.8 Table 1
shows the boost in monthly benefits
for each year of benefit deferral, such
as the 43 percent increase in benefits
to workers who delay claiming OASI
until their FRA (from age 62 to 67).
Despite these substantial monthly
increases, a large share of U.S. workers
claims benefits and ceases working

NOTES
This research draws on the authors’ research. See Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla, and Tatjana
Schimetschek, “Will They Take the Money and Work? An
Empirical Analysis of People’s Willingness to Delay Claiming
Social Security Benefits for a Lump Sum.” NBER Working
Paper 20614, 2014. Below we refer to this study as MMRS.
2 This exhaustion date is taken from the 2015 Annual Report
of the Board of Trustees of the OASI and DI Trust Funds, July
22, 2015. We note that Trust Funds assets consist mainly
of IOU’s owed by the US Treasury to Social Security; see
1

John Cogan and Olivia S. Mitchell, “Perspectives from the
President’s Commission on Social Security Reform,” Journal
of Economic Literature 17(2): 149-172.
3 Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative, “SSDI Reform: Promoting Return to Work without Compromising Economic
Security,” September 2015.
4 Letter from the Social Security Administration to Speaker
John Boehner, October 27, 2015. Note: these estimates are
preliminary and subject to change.
5 Of the 12.40% OASDI payroll tax, the SSDI Trust Fund will

2

receive 2.37% from 2016-2018, up from 1.80%.
Karen E. Smith, “Can Social Security Be Solvent?” Urban
Institute, October 2015.
7 See MMRS, cited above.
8 The SSA determines workers’ PIAs based on their personal
earnings histories; for the agency’s benefit calculators see
http://1.usa.gov/1RyfynL.
9 Meanwhile, OASI payments make up only about 17% of
aggregate income for Americans age 65+ in the highest
income quintile, as funds from pensions, personal financial
6
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TABLE 1:

DELAYED CLAIMING BOOSTS MONTHLY SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS:
STATUS QUO

Claiming

Monthly

Boost with 1

Cumulative boost

Age

Benefit: (% of PIA)

year delay (%)

compared to age 62 (%)

62

70		

63

75

7.14

7.14

64

80

6.67

14.29

65

86.67

8.34

23.81

66

93.33

7.70

33.33

67

100

7.15

42.86

68

108

8

54.29

69

116

7.41

65.71

70

124

6.90

77.14

Notes: Full Retirement Age (FRA): 67; PIA = Primary Insurance Amount. Source: www.ssa.gov.

as young as possible. According to
the SSA, Social Security accounts for
the lion’s share of aggregate income,
roughly 84%, for Americans older
than age 65 in the lowest income
quintile.9 Therefore, given the sheer
dependence that many U.S. households have on Social Security, the
choice of when to elect benefits is
likely the most important financial
decision they will ever make over
their lifetimes.
In related work, Mitchell has also
shown that many Americans lack a
good command of even basic aspects
of financial literacy, much less annui-

tized payments like Social Security or
how to value them.10
For this reason, the MMRS team
designed a test to determine the
perceived value of an actuarially fair
lump sum option for delaying Social
Security benefit claiming, and whether
offering people this could induce them
to delay claiming and work longer.
Developing a survey of U.S. residents
within the framework of the RAND
American Life Panel (ALP), they
assessed people’s responsiveness to
the idea of suddenly having access to
the present value of benefit increases
earned by working longer in the form

NOTES
assets, and other earnings streams act to diversify retirement income sources. Source: Social Security Administration, Income of the Aged Chartbook, 2012. US SSA: April
2014.
10		 See Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell. “Financial
Literacy and Economic Outcomes: Evidence and Policy
Implications. Journal of Retirement Economics. 2015. 3(1):
107-114; and Jeffrey R. Brown, Arie Kapteyn, and Olivia S.
Mitchell. “Framing and Claiming: How Information Framing
Affects Expected Social Security Claiming Behavior.” Journal

of Risk and Insurance. 2013.
Wealth also plays a role in the labor force participation decision: those with the most wealth are the least likely to extend
their working lives, since they can choose to self-finance
their retirements before collecting their lump sums.
12 Susann Rohwedder and Robert J. Willis, 2010, “Mental Retirement,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1), 119-38.
13 Gabriel Sahlgren. “Work Longer, Live Healthier – The Relationship between Economic Activity, Health, and Government
Policy,” IEA Discussion Paper No. 46, 2013.
11
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of a lump sum. They first calculated
and presented to each respondent
their unique monthly OASI benefit
from age 62 through age 70 under
the status quo system rules, based on
answers from questions about their
own work histories. Then, after asking
respondents their planned claiming
ages, the researchers offered two
alternative scenarios to their 2,451
survey participants.
In the first experimental scenario
(i.e., Lump Sum, or LS), a worker was
offered her age 62 monthly benefit
plus a lump sum that would grow
the longer she waited to claim Social
Security. This lump sum was actuarially fair, meaning that it was equal to
the present value of all future benefit
increases under the status quo, payable on the date of her claiming. In
the second experimental scenario
(i.e., Delayed Lump Sum, or DLS),
if a worker waited until her FRA
to claim Social Security, she would
receive her higher monthly payment
(just as under the status quo), but if
she delayed claiming even longer, she
would receive her higher FRA benefit
(as of age 67) plus a lump sum, similar
to the LS scenario. These scenarios
accordingly cost taxpayers no more or
less money than the current system,
since the lump sums and benefits were
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set as actuarially neutral.
The order in which respondents
saw each of the two scenarios was
randomized, so that researchers could
compare how claiming ages would
change vis-à-vis the status quo, and to
control for framing effects across survey participants. Finally, the researchers asked respondents to state how
much additional work each would
engage in, depending on the scenario,
in order to determine whether any
delayed claiming would be associated
with an increase in work, along with
the longer wait to claim benefits.

SURVEY FINDINGS
The researchers find that a large
group of respondents would prefer
to work longer and delay claiming
Social Security if they can receive an
actuarially fair lump sum instead of
higher annuity payments. Compared
to the status quo, people would delay
claiming under the LS scenario by an
additional five months on average, and
of those five months, they would continue working for two of them. Under
the DLS scenario, people would delay
claiming by about eight months more
on average, and of those eight months
they would continue working for four
of them.
As noted above, the presentation
of each scenario was randomized,
and the authors found that framing
did play a significant role in shaping
respondents’ claiming patterns. For
those who first saw the LS scenario
which offered a substantial lump
sum relatively early (i.e., on average $73,000 for claiming at age 66),
respondents delayed their claiming
by very little. For those shown the

DLS scenario first, survey participants anchored on a higher claiming
age and lower lump sum, since the
lump sum would be payable only after
reaching FRA. Accordingly, those who
saw the LS scenario second delayed
their claiming by more, although not
as long as in the DLS scenario.
Figure 1 depicts the results of the
delayed claiming decision due to the
lump sum incentives, while Figure
2 shows how much additional labor
force participation would result. In

both cases, the box plots denote the
25th and 75th percentiles, while
the line inside each box reflects the
median survey response (the dot
represents the mean response). All
numbers are in months post age 62.
For example, under the DLS scenario,
Figure 1 shows that respondents
would claim at 53.3 months after age
62 on average, or about eight months
later than their stated claiming ages
under the status quo (45 months, on
average). Additionally, Figure 2 shows

FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMING AGES: STATUS QUO VS. TWO
LUMP SUM ALTERNATIVES
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL WORK EFFORT: STATUS QUO VS. TWO
LUMP SUM ALTERNATIVES
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that these respondents would spend
38.7 percent of their time in additional fulltime work post-age 62,
or 4 months more than under the
status quo.
The researchers then conducted
multivariate regression analysis to
evaluate how people with specific
characteristics (e.g., sex, age, marital status, education level, economic
status, and other preferences) might
change their behavior under the two
alternative scenarios, holding other
factors constant. Ultimately, only a
few variables significantly differentiated those who were responsive to the
lump sum offer, from those who were
not. In addition to the order in which
respondents saw the scenarios, other
significant factors included financial
literacy, political trust in the OASDI
program, and a high level of indebtedness. All were associated with a larger
claiming delay (presumably in order
to obtain a larger lump sum). But perhaps the most interesting result of all
is that the respondents who were most
responsive to the lump sum alternatives were those who would have
claimed earliest under the status quo.
In other words, these were the same

people who stand to benefit the most
from higher monthly payments under
the current regime.

LESSONS FOR
POLICYMAKERS
Policymakers seeking to bolster the
solvency of Social Security without
raising taxes or cutting retirement
benefits may find new reform ideas
in these findings, as well as the fact
that people’s delayed claiming patterns do not differ by wealth levels,
the presence of other annuities, OASI
benefit amounts, planning horizons, or
expected investment.11
The benefits of delayed claiming
include the obvious result of additional months or years of individual
contributions to Social Security
through payroll taxes, which could
modestly improve the program’s solvency. Continued labor force participation could also result in improved
physical and mental health among the
elderly.12 In turn, this latter benefit
may enhance the financial status of
healthcare systems such as Medicare
and Medicaid. It could also help offset
the macroeconomic costs of an aging

5

population, if quality of life for individual workers does in fact improve
on account of longer working lives.13
Lastly, though the survey designed by
the researchers in this instance was
created to be budget-neutral to avoid
any wealth transfers between generations, it remains to be seen whether
people might also be willing to delay
claiming and work longer for lump
sums that are less than actuarially
fair, which would enhance the Social
Security program’s sustainability.

CONCLUSION
Policymakers who are serious about
reforming Social Security to improve
solvency would do well to explore
lump sums as an alternative to the
status quo of higher annuity payments
as a reward for delayed claiming. The
usual reform options which fuel current debates about winners and losers
in the realm of Social Security have
not advanced the dialogue, much less
action, regarding how to make the
system solvent for current and future
generations. The clock ticks, and the
U.S. needs new thinking based on
solid evidence.
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